ViP2's Coaches' Corner

[Agony]

@Kane, pos for posting the 2 articles above *bookmarks blogs*

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I think poor team shape is one of United's biggest problems.

A lot of work in training needs to be done on how the shape is when we're defending cause I think it's one of the main reasons why we concede so many goals and don't dominate games

In attack it's only issue depending on the team selection and formation

[Anderson]

Evras positioning has been woeful of late (Last couple seasons). He used to have that electric pace and great stamina to continually get himself back in position but since thats started declining its become a major issue for us

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Blogs are decent

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Safe for barca book link

[Agony]

Player Focus: Premier Possession Winners

by Alistair Tweedale at Tuesday, Dec 18 2012 16:34

 

 

 

Every fan has a favourite player for their team, and quite often goalscorers get the lion's share of the praise. Managers will also have their favoured players, and their choice will rarely correlate with that of the fans, because managers will pay more attention to the finer details, with those players that break up play and win possession for their side often among the most key to their plans.

Here, WhoScored.com take a look at the top ball-winners in the Premier League this season, with a few players popping up that regularly find that praise passes them by.

 

Possession won in the defensive third

When it comes to the players to have won the ball the most times in their team's defensive third of the pitch, it is surprising to find that it is in fact a midfielder that leads proceedings.

Steve Clarke's West Brom have impressed many this season with a fluent passing game that has seen them hanging around near the top of the table, with their attacking exploits taking much of the limelight. Youssuf Mulumbu is a vital cog in their machine, though, and having won possession a total of 70 times in the third of the pitch nearest his own goal, it is easy to see why. No other midfielder in the division gets near him with this tally, though defenders Davide Santon (66) and Jan Vertonghen (62) are not all that far behind. Mulumbu's value is all over the pitch, as he shown by the goal and assist he already has to his name, whilst only 5 players have won the ball in the middle of the park more times than him.

Possession won in the middle third

At Liverpool, Brendan Rodgers is sometimes criticised for his decision to spend big on bringing Joe Allen with him when he moved to Anfield in the summer, though given the fact that Allen wins the ball so much, it may not have been solely due to his passing abilities, as many might believe.

Allen has won the ball a massive 86 times in the middle third of the pitch this season; a tally at least 16 greater than any other player in the Premier League, with Mikel Arteta and Marouane Fellaini following on 70. Allen's work is so often overlooked, and Liverpool’s rivals sometimes tout him as a waste of money, but there is no reason to underestimate the value of such a player. He has also won the ball more times in total over the whole of the pitch than any other player in the English top flight this season, gaining possession back for his side an incredible 147 times.

 

 

He wins the ball in central midfield time and again, playing the ball off simply afterwards, and with a 90.8% pass success rate to boot, which only 9 Premier League regulars - 4 of which are defenders - can better, he is a great player to have on board. While strikers usually hold the key to the fans' hearts, Allen is a prime example of a manager’s favourite, and there is good reason to agree with Rodgers' choice on this one.

Arteta is much the same in this way. More often than not, he plays it simple and his main job is to win back and retain possession for his side rather than do anything too ambitious, though Fellaini is rather a more attack minded player, but he gets stuck in and is not scared to go in for tough challenges to win the ball. In terms of times the ball has been won in the middle third of the pitch, Everton's Leon Osman (67) and West Ham's Mark Noble (65) make up the top 5 ahead of Mulumbu (62).

 

Possession won in the attacking third

In England, we love a striker that will run themselves into the ground for the cause of the team, and sometimes adore them yet more if they are from another part of the world and take it upon themselves to prove their worth to their new team through hard work. While Luis Suarez often makes the headlines for the wrong reasons, no one can deny his work rate is second-to-none, and he has arguably won the fans over in spite of his misdemeanours as a result of it.

Carlos Tevez is a striker of a similar ilk to Suarez in this way, and if the Argentine were to get more of a run in City's first team he may have won more of the ball than the 10 times that puts him joint fifth in the rankings for possession won high up the pitch. However, Suarez is streaks ahead of anyone else, having won the ball 16 times in the attacking third, with the closest player to him on 11. Along with Joe Allen, Rodgers clearly has his players putting in the work, though that is simply not enough for his team at the moment. Raheem Sterling is joint second behind Suarez, along with Steven Pienaar and former Liverpool man Charlie Adam (11), but their ball winning has not paid enough dividends, with 9 teams having scored more goals than Liverpool (23), despite them having more shots than any other team (323).

Suarez has been fantastic this season, and he is one of few strikers nowadays that is of great worth both with and without the ball.

 

http://www.whoscored.com/Blog/nfjguoozpumzj-wg7xluca/Show/Player-Focus-Premier-Possession-Winners

[Agony]

[Anderson]

Busquets>>>

[LS]

Busquets>>>

[The Infamous]

Busquets>>>

the rotating of the ball he does in the attacking video on his first touch gets him TIME on the pitch

 

true genius killed the workhorse dm phase 

[Agony]

La Croqueta

WEDNESDAY, 12 DECEMBER 2012

The evolution of Frank de Boer

Frank de Boer is Ajax's seventh longest serving manager, out of twenty-five, since Rinus Michels took office in January 1965. Photograph: Proshots

A month before taking the managerial hot seat at Ajax a fresh-faced Frank de Boer travelled to Barcelona, still a youth team coach and part of the Dutch national team set-up as Bert van Marwijk's assistant, this wasn't a personal visit but one he'd hope would further shape his footballing vision. It did.

De Boer was a guest of former teammate Pep Guardiola, after sharing old memories, it quickly transpired to the reason for his visit. Reminiscent of Guardiola's now famous meeting with Marcelo Bielsa, there was no barbeque, and it didn't last eleven hours. However there was the same passionate discussion of the game, every subject under the sun was touched upon from Barcelona's training methods, Dutch football theorem (and its future) to their unique style of play. Phillip Cocu since commented how that meeting changed De Boer. It proved to be enlightening, showcased by the contrast in football displayed at Ajax from De Boer's first few months in charge.

There was also an underlying reason: Guardiola's conviction De Boer would be an outstanding manager. His feeling was anything picked up in his young (and successful) managerial career to date could be invaluable to the Dutchman, who shared a similar belief in how football should be played. De Boer was an admirer and Guardiola was more than happy to help with his fact-finding mission remembering not so long ago he was in a similar position, inspired by those who've tasted management and shared his outlook, Juanma Lillo springs to mind.

As teammates both often enjoyed lengthy conversations, De Boer noted how Guardiola back then was effectively a coach. Guardiola equally saw the same in the former Oranje skipper even if De Boer doubted himself. A decade ago Bielsa advised Guardiola to go into management. Guardiola was now doing the same. In fact once De Boer eventually went into coaching, after retiring in 2006, Guardiola approached him to be his assistant – once learning he'd be taking over from Frank Rijkaard – an invitation De Boer turned down, in order to strike out his own path. One trait both have in common is their steadfast belief in the 'Ajax model'. Ronald – Frank's twin – once said Guardiola is borderline obsessed, describing him as 'half-Dutch', after discovering and learning under Johan Cruyff and then Louis van Gaal. It was the latter whose distinct brand Guardiola revealed shaped much of his Barcelona side. "My jaw dropped when I saw Van Gaal's Ajax play," Guardiola wrote in his autobiography 'My People, My Football'. "They perfectly did everything a football team should do in my eyes."

De Boer's own philosophy, started to unfold after the meeting with Guardiola in late 2010 – since then they've regularly kept in touch – an amalgamation of the Cruijffianen and Van Gaalisten School: individual and collectivism intertwined, each individual's strength combines to make a strong eleven, the whole is greater than the sum of its parts. "We are now more of a unit," Toby Alderweireld stated when comparing to the approach under Martin Jol, when there was a large dependency on "one or two" players (notably Luis Suárez). Though a disciple of Cruyff and Van Gaal, evident in rekindling their ideas, and Cruyff being an advisor (top-to-bottom Ajax now following his vision in running a club, shades of Barcelona in the last decade) it's Guardiola's Barça he's used as his reference on the basis the Catalan side in the last four years shown the 'Ajax way' has a place in the 21st century.

De Boer doesn't claim to be innovate, instead appreciates his many influences, often describing himself as a 'student of the game'. Guardiola stood for everything Barça. De Boer is the same with Ajax. He lived and breathed the club as a player. "Frank de Boer is een echte Ajacied" is commonly sung by supporters. More than most he understands their traditions and what it stands for. If a club in Catalunya can adopt their values, especially if it's proven to be successful, then there's no shame in taking certain parts of their game to improve his team. They're not a carbon copy, still worlds apart, but can be put in the same side of the spectrum.

What does set De Boer apart is his acumen, a sharp thinker but also a meticulous planner, every opposition analysed (with the aid of Tonny Bruins Slot and Dennis Bergkamp) in the greatest of details. It's speculative, but watching Ajax today you get the impression De Boer put those theories discussed with Guardiola, the same ones Barça adhere to, into practice. It's been a gradual process, still is, which only serves as proof of De Boer's unyielding character and desire to restore Ajax back in Europe's conscious. Guardiola and Van Gaal were among the many including predecessor Marco van Basten to congratulate De Boer on his appointment, after Martin Jol's unexpected (but anticipated) resignation forty eight hours before a Champions League away tie against AC Milan. The youngster (along with his brother) spotted by Cruyff all those years ago was now at the helm of his boyhood club. He would win his first match in charge, a historic one, never before have the Amsterdammers tasted victory at the San Siro.

It would prove to be bittersweet as they had already been eliminated from the competition. However it would be used as an example of what can be possible. He doesn't have a seasoned squad at his disposal and it's ever-changing nevertheless he's a manager in the perfect environment – a former youth team coach working with familiar faces – what De Boer has done and continues to do so is further evidence, clear and concise instructions coupled with the right training – following the Michels model (individual based training) – attaining a high level of football isn't beyond Ajax. His players towards the end of last season were fitter than they were at the start, covering more ground, circulating the ball at a rapid rate. There was a comfortable equilibrium in transition between attack and defence which you'd expect from a club renowned for its mastery of intelligent football. The same is expected in the second half of this current campaign.

From day one De Boer has been unequivocal when it comes to the style of football Ajax would play under him, despite his analytical obsession, doesn't believe in adapting to the opponent but rather playing their own game. "I'd rather go down fighting," he once boasted. "I share Louis van Gaal's desire to make continuous progress, to demand that your team constantly push things to the limit," he added. "When it comes to playing football, movement on the field and attacking, I am close to Johan Cruyff's philosophy. Simple football is the most beautiful. But playing simple football is the hardest thing." His contempt for the football displayed under Jol couldn't have been any more louder, labelling it unrecognisable, in some quarters unworthy of Ajax. "It did have some success but clashed with the traditional approach, which I know like the back of my hand. This is my club."

It was back to basics: traditional 4-3-3 with orthodox wingers. Even that has slightly changed; today the norm would be wide forwards, on occasions even using a deep-lying forward (false nine). The turning point was this spring, after their humiliating defeat to FC Utrecht, everything changed from that moment. The Ajax you see today started to emerge. All it took was putting emphasis on one position. Sergio Busquets has long fascinated De Boer. A third centre-back. This particular type of footballer has long existed in Dutch football, the 'controller' (number six), but Busquets – under Guardiola – has added a modern interpretation. One that has since been pivotal to De Boer realising his objectives; which is to dominant games through possession: circulation football as a means to not only create goal scoring opportunities but also a defensive weapon. The role was assigned to Vurnon Anita, instantly adapting – made easier by Ajax's system (likewise same for Christian Poulsen and Lasse Schöne since) – instructions couldn't be any clearer: retain and recycle possession.

In some parts keeping the ball is often looked down upon, but for De Boer this is the only way, without the ball the opposition can't harm you. Also it conserves energy, you can see how they seldom pass more than ten metres during a build-up phase, this goes back to Cruyff's ideal to let the ball do the running, taken a while but under De Boer they've got the hang of it.

'Pressure play' is a term De Boer often talks about. It centres on winning the ball back, as soon as it's lost (by pressing), another tenet of the Van Gaal philosophy incorporated in De Boer's approach. Guardiola famously took it to extreme levels and De Boer is following suit. It's a process that predominantly happens on instinct (playing a high defensive line helps). Ajax press the moment they lose possession. That is the perfect time because the opposing player who has just won the ball is vulnerable. He's wasted energy, winning the ball, meaning he's probably tired. De Boer's aim is for his side to dispossess the player before he can give to a better positioned teammate. If the ball isn't won as quickly as expected the players retreat to form a compact ten-man wall, the distance between the last defender and attacking focal point is roughly around 30 metres A switch made easy due to how close they play to each other (makes it easier to play their triangles as well). As you expect this should pose, in theory at least, a challenge for the opposition to get through.

Frank de Boer and Pep Guardiola played two seasons together at FC Barcelona winning one championship. It was there both started to consider life as coaches.

Ajax's near fanatical version of circulation football hasn't gone without criticism. In their recent win over VVV Venlo, where they had 81% possession of the ball, some labelled it "boring". De Boer, taken aback, defended his team's philosophy, stating they weren't keeping possession for the sake of it, adding an exciting game of football needs two participants. VVV were more than happy to let Ajax keep the ball and wait to counter (which they found difficult to execute). Nonetheless, the instillation of a 'third centre-back' has played a significant part in the Amsterdammers possession-based game increasing tenfold, so far this season they're averaging 600 passes per game (481 completed) and 80% possession (tikkie-takkie voetbal as one commentator put it).

As a former defender par-excellence this is the one area of the pitch De Boer has focused a great deal on. For obvious reasons, his tenets – much of which adopted from his mentors – dictated that Ajax must build from the back. "Cruyff told us that the players with the best ball handling skills should be the defenders," said Guardiola. "As they need to bring you out of trouble and set up the forwards with their play." De Boer agrees. Niklas Moisander has the highest pass completion rate followed by Toby Alderweireld. The skilled 'sweeper-keeper' Kenneth Vermeer, in essence acts like an extra outfield player, is integral to their system: recycling possession, keeping circulation of the ball flowing, and re-launching attacks. If an error is made, which is always a possibility, the instruction from De Boer is to always continue and never turn back. Jan Vertonghen, who played a key role last season – in his own words "effectively as a playmaker" – described De Boer as the best coach he's played under, adding how returning much of the clubs former principles was his biggest success. The next step will be for the 'third centre-back', and two midfielders in front, to take a greater lead in initiating attacks in tandem with the mobile central defenders (reliance gradually diminished).

However the most interesting facet regarding the defence, in last few months, is the actual defending. Notably if De Boer has implemented Barcelona's '3-1' rule (adopted from the Italian game). You see more and more examples proving it to be the case, take their last game against Groningen, after Alderweireld carelessly gave the ball away, Moisander approached the attacker and the other three – Ricardo van Rhijn, Alderweireld and Daley Blind – formed a wall behind him. If the hunch is correct – De Boer not spoken in detail – all signs suggest it is; then it's a ploy they're clearly working on, not quite at the level of Tito Vilanova's side, but one De Boer feels can benefit his team.

The role of the full-backs is the one of the most fascinating aspect of watching Ajax today, Van Rhijn and Blind are essentially auxiliary wingers, in turn leads to the side adopting various formations/shapes most of the time in reaction to the opposition. The most common is their 3-1-4-2, but they've shown the wherewithal to even adopt a 1-3-3-3, this of course is during a game as De Boer lines his team out in their usual 4-3-3. The changing of formation now comes naturally, all it takes is one or two to move out of their space, once an area is vacated a teammate would drop in – maintaining the shape – before you ask, no this isn't 'total football', just a modernised version of Ajax's positional interchange game, which De Boer thrived under during his playing days. De Boer's goal is 'universality': players comfortable in multiple positions and roles. Example: Christian Eriksen playing in front of the defence and controller moving into central midfield. The number nine zone especially when De Boer plays with a deep-lying forward is always left vacant. Not quite in the spirit of Rinus Michels but encapsulates a newfound joie de vivre.

De Boer, like Van Gaal, is a passing fetishist. If you can "pass at speed" there's a good chance of selection. Every single one is important, once winning possession the job is to keep the ball, everyone back into position – even corners are routinely played short – until a gap appears, subsequently each attack is built patiently with the desire to finish with a sweeping move. The one exception is if possession is regained inside the penalty area, or just outside, then they attempt on goal. There's no secret to De Boer's approach. Jim Collins, wrote the secret of long-term success lies in cultivating a distinctive set of values, this usually means promoting from within and putting down deep local roots. One of the secrets to Ajax's success is how much of their players were moulded within the system in their academy. Daley Blind, often criticised – though undergoing a breakout season – might not be the best left-back around but how many know the 'Ajax way' inside-out? Especially the version De Boer professes.

With his second anniversary in charge just celebrated: sixth coach to reach the milestone since Michels left office in 1971. De Boer continues to improve as a manager as well as tactician. The most notable is enhancement of their 'positional interchange' game (as explained above). His players now, more than at the beginning, think correctly under pressure having the mental acumen and foresight to adjust tactics and formation if it's not working. It's still a work in progress, but they're heading in the direction De Boer wants to go, ultimate goal is to dominate the middle third of the pitch making it the norm. The next phase in their evolution most onlookers believe will be – if feasible – a return to their fabled '3-7' system, under Cruyff they played a 3-3-1-3; it was more of a flexible 3-1-2-3-1 during Van Gaal's era. Already De Boer has commented how a three-man defence intrigues him calling the 3-4-3 (diamond) formation his personal favourite.

No longer a force on the continent they still remain one of the most admired, Borussia Dortmund winger Marco Reus told Voetbal International how much he loves their brand of football (suggesting they reminded him of Barcelona who we mustn't forget attribute much of their ethos to the side from Amsterdam), his manager Jürgen Klopp, a fan of the 'Ajax school', enthusiastically praised De Boer for returning their celebrated model. Another big admirer recently met up with Cruyff, and the two discussed the strides made by Ajax in the last ten months under De Boer, both equally content with his transformation of the clubs playing style. The other man of course was Guardiola.

http://jouracule.blogspot.co.uk/2012/12/the-evolution-of-frank-de-boer_12.html?m=1

[Agony]

Team Focus: Southampton - The Pochettino Effect

by Alistair Tweedale at Tuesday, Jan 22 2013 16:11

 

 

 

The arrival of a new manager at a club is often enough to galvanise a failing side, but in the case of Southampton, Mauricio Pochettino had come to St Mary's with the club unbeaten in 5 Premier League games and on their way up the table. On the back of an impressive draw at Stamford Bridge after having been 2 goals down, it wouldn't have been unreasonable for the fans to hope for, or even expect, a similar result at home to an Everton side that had drawn 10 of their 22 games so far this season.

In particular, with Southampton's games having seen 70 goals this season - more than 16 of the 20 teams in the English top flight - and Everton both scoring and conceding in a Premier League record of 16 consecutive matches prior to their goalless draw against Swansea last week, it was perhaps fair to say that another 0-0 draw was relatively unexpected.

Now, while some home fans may have been disappointed by the blank drawn by the Saints, they will have been buoyed by their team's overall performance, particularly in the first half when Everton were restricted to only 3 attempts on goal, and only one of which hit the target. Much of this was to do with the high, aggressive pressing game that Pochettino became a known advocate of during his time at Espanyol.

With the second half more evenly balanced out, Southampton pegged back the Toffees in the first half, with 32% of the play taking place in Everton's defensive third of the pitch and 47% in the middle third. Everton are not used to being put on the back foot to such an extent, but Pochettino clearly had his players in the mindset to press high up the pitch and they did so effectively.

 

 

 

Everton could only manage a pass completion rate of 69.5% in the Southampton game, which was by far their lowest of the season. Furthermore, Everton completed only 77.2% of their passes in their own half; also the worst they have had in a Premier League game this season, just behind their rate of 78.4% against league leaders Manchester United. It was also the 12th worst by any team this term, with only QPR (20th in the table), Reading (18th), Southampton (15th), West Ham (12th) and Stoke (10th) having record lower values.

A look at the match report backs up these suggestions, with Southampton stated as having stolen the ball from the opposition often. Also stated here, however, as the Saints' other two strengths in this match, are that they attacked effectively from long shots and set pieces. That is, 8 of Southampton's 16 attempts on goal - including Rickie Lambert hitting the post - came from set pieces, and 7 of their 16 came from long range.

While this is not to say that Southampton played badly and did not attack with the fluidity that we have come to expect of them, it is interesting to note that the closest they came to scoring was from such situations. Having scored twice from open play against Chelsea, with all 6 of their goal attempts also coming from normal play, they are not a team that rely on set pieces. Could it have been that there was such emphasis on a high pressing game that the players weren't used to, that they tired by the time they won the ball and their thoughts turned to attack? Gaston Ramirez and Guly Do Prado, selected in attacking midfield, each made a total of 7 tackles and interceptions against Everton, despite respective averages before that game of 3.1 and 1.3. Clearly, they were told to make inroads into the Everton defence in this way, and clearly, the message got through, but just as obvious was the fact that they tired, as they were withdrawn after 71 and 62 minutes. Pochettino himself admitted that fatigue started to kick in after the break, whilst David Moyes stated that his team became 'frustrated' in the first half, only to settle in during the second - once the pressing became less intense.

Of course, one game is not enough to be able to draw strong conclusions on the effect of an incoming manager and the tactics he looks to implement on his new squad. Nonetheless, Pochettino was expected to change the style of play at St Mary's and it looks, from first viewing, as if he is going to do just that.

 

http://www.whoscored.com/Blog/wqtd0vs1w0s2nzvm5bighq/Show/Team-Focus-Southampton-The-Pochettino-Effect

[Agony]

Player Focus: Goalkeepers' Save Success Rates

by Alistair Tweedale at Thursday, Jan 24 2013 16:53

 

 

 

The goalkeeper: the last line of defence. Some say the most important man in a team, others say less so, possibly in the hope that they will not be needed if the outfielders do their jobs properly. The fact of the matter is, though, that goalkeepers are key to a team's success, and a good goalkeeping performance can often coincide with a positive result.

Of course most important in a goalkeeper's game is his shot-stopping, so here we take a look at how much success 'keepers across Europe's top 5 leagues have had in keeping the ball out of the net, concentrating on the best, and worst, goalkeepers in terms of save success rate. That is, those that have saved the highest and lowest proportions of the shots on target they have faced this season, with only those to have made at least 10 appearances considered.

The Best

Manuel Neuer's reputation continues to grow and grow, and at 26-years-old he could well retain both the Bayern Munich and Germany no. 1 jerseys for a long time to come. Nobody would doubt his capabilities, but one might reasonably assume that his job behind sturdy, well-organised defences could be easier than other stoppers. With Bayern only having allowed their opponents 47 shots on target this season - the fewest in Europe's top 5 leagues - that is certainly the case, but Neuer's save success rate of 85.1% is not to be sniffed at, it being the best rate going. Bayern have only conceded 7 league goals all season, and Neuer's 40 saves have most certainly helped out, with the vast majority (31 out of 47) of the shots he has faced coming from inside the penalty area.

Paris Saint Germain's Salvatore Sirigu is currently on a run of 686 minutes without conceding a Ligue 1 goal; a run stretching back over his last 8 appearances. The Italian has only let in 8 goals all season and has saved a massive 83.3% of the shots on target he has faced. PSG restrict their opponents to almost half their shots on target from outside the area and so this may well have a hand in Sirigu's impressive saving stats.

The only other 'keeper across the top 5 leagues to keep out over four-fifths of the shots on target he has faced is Swansea's backup stopper, Gerhard Tremmel, who was only given a run in the team due to the absence through injury of WhoScored's 2011/12 Premier League goalkeeper of the season, Michel Vorm. Vorm has, though, been outperformed by his understudy in terms of shots-to-saves rate, with Tremmel keeping out 81.5% of shots faced compared to Vorm's 65.7%. While there is more to keeping goal than shot-stopping, it could well be that Tremmel deserves more of run in the team regardless of Vorm's return to action.

Not far behind Tremmel is the third most expensive goalkeeper in footballing history; Manchester United's oft-criticised David De Gea. People regularly focus on the young Spaniard's flaws when coming for crosses rather than the great shot-stopping abilities that were on show, in particular, in United's recent draw at Tottenham. While he was once again unconvincing under crosses, he excelled when facing attempts on goal, many of them from close range. His save success rate of 78.7% is the joint 4th best in Europe's top 5 leagues.

Making up the top 5 is Malaga's number 1, Willy Caballero, who has made exactly the same number of saves (59) from exactly the same number of shots faced (75) as De Gea, resulting in the same save success (78.7%). Caballero has similar struggles to the former Atletico keeper as well, with both possessing 'shot stopping' as a WhoScored strength, but 'catching crosses' as a weakness. Caballero has, though, conceded fewer goals (17) than De Gea (19) despite making 5 more appearances, and has 9 clean sheets already this term, fewer only than 6 goalkeepers across Europe's top 5 leagues.

 

 

 

The Worst

Bastia currently sit fairly comfortably in 13th place in the Ligue 1 table, although, in spite of there being 7 teams below them, they possess the French top flight's most leaky defence, having already let 44 goals through their grasp in 21 games this season. However, whilst many will phrase this the 'worst defence' in the league, they have not had all that much help from their man between the sticks, Magno Macedo Novaes. It is fair to say that Brazil aren't famed for producing lots of quality keepers, and Novaes fits the bill, making only 30 saves and conceding 29 goals in his 12 appearances, giving him a save success rate of just 50.8%. There is little surprise that he was dropped at the start of November and hasn't regained his place in the team.

Deportivo La Coruna's return to La Liga began so well. They started the season with a 4 match unbeaten run, before the wheels quickly, and quite dramatically, came off. They are bottom of the table having conceded more goals than any other team, and goalkeeper Daniel Aranzubia has provided little in the way of resistance, preventing only 52.9% of shots on target from going in, the second worst rate in the top 5 European leagues.

When Hugo Lloris arrived at Tottenham, many thought he would walk straight into the starting XI and solve whatever goalkeeping deficiencies Brad Friedel might have. The most prominent of those was thought to be his lack of agility and reluctance to come off his line. However, it seems that shot-stopping was also a problem, with the American keeping out just 55.8% of the shots on target he faced; the 3rd worst rate in Europe. However, Lloris has not fared much better, the Frenchman maintaining the 9th worst save-to-shots ratio in Europe's top 5 leagues this season (61.0%). The fact that Spurs have allowed a Premier League-low of just 16 shots on target from outside the box compared to a massive 64 inside the penalty area, may have something to do with it, but that is not to excuse such poor rates on both of their parts.

Werder Bremen, Bundesliga champions just 9 years ago and runners up in 2008, have slid down the table in recent years, and are in a disappointing 12th place just after the halfway mark this season. Only two teams have let in more goals than Werder (34) this season, though it is not as if they allow their opponents a shed load of shots - the 7th fewest, in fact, in the Bundesliga (222). The result of that is ever-present goalkeeper Sebastian Mielitz's extremely poor save success rate of just 59.0%.

Finally, the 5th worst between the sticks this season, has been Lloris' number 2 in the France squad, Steve Mandanda. The Marseille stopper has kept out a below par 59.4% of the shots on target he has faced in his 21 league appearances in 2012/13, but will surely need to do more for his club if they are to push on and challenge for honours at the top of Ligue 1. The fact that France's supposed top two goalkeepers both rank in in the bottom 10 for save success this season certainly does not make for pretty reading for Didier Deschamps, and he might even consider looking elsewhere if things continue in the same vein for much longer.

 

http://www.whoscored.com/Blog/cn_uyjpro0sf1kw2s_rvzg/Show/Player-Focus-Goalkeepers-Save-Success-Rates

[Michel Kane]

The present obsession with ball possession that we see so frequently in our game is due I believe to the mis-applied effect of unrealistic statistics. The real reasons for the use of ‘keep-ball’ tactics in the game of football should not be about the number of passes achieved – but the number of penetrations achieved!

 

 

Ball retention in a phase of play must supply two vital playing ingredients: (a) it must deny the opposition the ball and ( it must create spaces in an opposing defensive system that must be penetrated. During prolonged, passing sequences a team in possession must be fully aware of the tactical reasons already mentioned. Whilst in possession, spaces must be created and recognized in any area of the field in which the ball is retained and all players must be aware of spaces when they become available and importantly, be able to exploit such spaces when they occur. 

Because teams’ tend to retain extra defenders at the back as an overload precaution against opposing attackers, it is in back areas that ball possession is easier to use. As the ball is moved towards the opposition’s end tactical numeracy tends to even before turning more advantageously to opposing defences; accordingly, the ability to retain the ball becomes more difficult as space becomes more congested in mid-field and front thirds.

Unfortunately, the game in this country has failed to recognize the opportunities that can be forthcoming in attacking play by developing more skilful players for back positions. The overuse of negative passing or long up-field punts by so many of our back players is directly due to their discomfort on the ball.  The biggest spaces that provide the best opportunities for positive possession play is occupied by players incapable of exploiting them! The lack of playing ability of those in back positions creates a negative influence on the playing style of those positioned ahead of them – forcing those in mid-field and up front to become ‘fighters and chasers’ when they should be stylish football artists.

 

 

 

As a result of the poor playing standards of those in back positions,  tactical ‘fluidity’ has been suppressed in our game. Rotational movement that would allow forward penetration and improve ball possession is rejected in favour of ‘solid’ systems of play. The over-emphasis on ‘safety first football’ in our game is directly due to skill deficiencies combined with a lack of playing intellect. Passing the ball in a keep-ball sequence looks a ‘painful’ intrusion on the ‘hit and hope’ style of play our players are more used to. There is a reluctance to ‘steady the ship’ and display a creative but ready to strike approach and impatience to get the ball forward too often takes control.

We must teach our players how to breach opposing defensive ‘shields’ in each of the playing thirds. Throughout the length of the field players must be able to switch from preparation play to penetrative surge when situations occur. Possession play must be seen as the ‘casual draw’ that provides the opportunity to ‘strike’. The ability to keep the ball by ‘bringing extra players to the party’ (overloading) must be an important part of player development in the future; but without also underlining the importance of incisive penetrations as the culmination of keep-ball sequences we will continue to allow statistics and not football logic to determine our football future.

[DRC]

If you're free I'd recommend attending this.

togsports is sick - similar to the technology Piero use for MNF, MOTD etc

 

Worthwhile attending for media & sport networking opportunities too if you're smart about it...
 

http://rtsw.co.uk/events/free-tog-training/

[Michel Kane]

Pos.

[Agony]

http://allasfcb.blogspot.co.uk

Barca tactics, analysis, videos, articles etc.

[Michel Kane]

[Zizouz]

Horncastle: Mind-games—A comparison between the training methods of Mourinho and Villas-Boas

While Jose Mourinho was at Inter, he was visited by four university students. They were seeking to understand his methods with a view to writing a thesis about them. He was happy to oblige. “People have a general idea of what I do,” Mourinho said, “and it’s insufficient.”

The insights he gave over the course of an interview were fascinating particularly because so much of it was centred around unlocking the mind’s potential.

Mourinho discussed the subconscious and procedural memory. That’s the memory of the performance of particular types of action. Take driving, for instance.

Initially, when you start to learn, you’re concentrated on what gear you’re in, how fast you’re going and when to check your mirrors, to signal and maneuver.

With time, however, this all becomes second nature. You drive without making a conscious effort. Adjustments are made more or less automatically, whatever road you’re on, so you can focus on other things and make other decisions.

This is what Mourinho sets out to achieve in training. But how exactly?

Every exercise is done with the ball. Most if not all sessions last 90 minutes, the duration of a game, or a maximum of 120 minutes, like one that goes into extra time.

Each one is devised with the aim of reproducing moments of a match, specific situations so that once they come in a competitive context the players know exactly what to do and where to be on the pitch, how to defend and how to attack in whatever formation they’re in or up against and according to the circumstances they find themselves in too, be they a goal up or a goal down, a man up or down to 10 men.

With time, these movements are made without conscious effort because they’ve been logged to procedural memory. In theory, the mental strain on a player is reduced. You’re more in control. You’re more lucid. You’re more able to anticipate things, read the play and not only make better decisions but vary them too.

This is important. Because Mourinho doesn’t want to create robots or automatons. They’re predictable and he doesn’t want his teams to be that way.

“When I set about studying opponents and attempt to identify their behaviour, their tactics,” he explained. “I often realize that the development of their playing dynamic is more a mechanical automatism than a true playing dynamic.”

Mourinho’s method, as defined by Corriere della Sera columnist Sandro Modeo, is instead structured but open, robust but plastic.

“The objective,” he said, “is that the players understand the playing system and trust it, that they take some initiative because they’re convinced that it’s the best thing to do and not because someone else says: ‘Do it that way’.

“I know where it is I want us to get to, but instead of telling them: ‘Go that way,’ I want them to find their own way there.”

Psychologically it’s much more satisfying and validating to find the solution to a problem yourself than have someone else solve it for you. Mourinho understands this. He calls it ‘guided discovery’.

I mention all this because I think it’s what we’re seeing at Tottenham under Andre Villas-Boas.

Various assumptions have been made about Mourinho’s former assistant during his time in England. One is that he’s a tactics obsessive and a lot of that is down to the anecdotes we’ve been told about him.

For instance, there’s the now famous one about how one day after finishing school, he plucked up the courage to knock on the door of Sir Bobby Robson, who just happened to live in the same apartment block while he was manager of Porto, to ask why he persisted in playing Sergei Yuran up front, a striker who wasn’t prolific, when he had Domingos Paciencia, a centre-forward with a track record of scoring goals, on the bench. Robson encouraged his curiosity and legend has it he soon had Villas-Boas writing scouting reports that he’d post through the letterbox for him to read.

There would be many more. One of them, written while Villas-Boas was part of Jose Mourinho’s staff at Chelsea ahead of a game against Newcastle United on November 19, 2005, was leaked soon after he got the manager’s position at Stamford Bridge in 2011. That and an interview he granted at the Cafe Maiorca to a University of Porto student, Daniel Sousa, who at the time was writing a thesis on football and is now his Head of Opposition Scouting at Tottenham, were used to reinforce this idea that his principal preoccupation was with tactics. “Bullshit that can baffle brains,” Harry Redknapp said, although not overtly in reference to his successor at White Hart Lane, to say nothing of all its modern accoutrements.

So, as you can imagine, there was some surprise when he revealed prior to Tottenham’s visit to West Ham 10 days ago: “I have never used Prozone. I don’t use it because I don’t believe [in it].” It wasn’t a complete myth-buster but showed how the general perception of Villas-Boas and what his management entails is narrow.

“Tactics will always be a part of the manager’s job,” Villas-Boas told France Football earlier this year. “But before you get to that, there’s the attitude of the player: his concentration, his motivation, his desire to win. And this is more a job for a human being than a coach.”

Which brings us back to Villas-Boas’ apparent repudiation of Prozone. “The mind and how the player feels,” he said, “is much more important for us, rather than statistical data.”

He elaborated further on this in France Football when asked to give an insight into what his average working day is like.

“In general, I work a lot on the philosophy and the way of expressing potential during matches, physically and psychologically,” Villas-Boas explained. “We therefore simulate all the situations that players could encounter during matches so that they might automatically adapt, so they know how to adjust mentally, make the right decision…

“We work a lot on instant decision-making for the good of the team. You can teach them things individually but the decision on the pitch belongs to them. And sometimes it’s not exactly what the manager has taught. Instinct is so vital because everything changes very quickly in game situations. Of course you want to see the team play attractive attacking football. But with great freedom of decision. The players take more pleasure in it. You teach them how to manage an experience, they take the decision.”

An example of this might be how Tottenham have managed to stop conceding late goals like they had done earlier in the season.

Asked how he had achieved this following a 1-0 win at home to Swansea in December, Villas Boas said: “We address it between us as a group in training. You know by stimulating concentration in the last part of training. It’s very difficult because you can’t recreate the stress of a game and the environment of a game but we had a go. As I said it doesn’t mean that the problem is solved but the players have a conscience that we have conceded in the past and we want to get it right.

Prompted to expand further on that and in particular how you devise an exercise to specifically stop conceding late goals, Villas-Boas smiled: “By increasing complexity in terms of the exercises that you do. So that the more complex the exercise the more concentrated you have to be to do it. [And] by the tasks that they have to do in the exercise, you have to be very very creative.

When seen in this light, Mourinho and Villas-Boas’ work is all the more fascinating precisely because they seek to train body and mind simultaneously.

“We [at Tottenham] want to promote decision-making by developing the instinct of the players, a job which leads to what a human being is truly about,” Villas-Boas explained.

So for those of you wondering what exactly his contribution has been to Gareth Bale’s best ever season and the consolidation of his reputation as maybe one of the world’s top players in his position, perhaps there’s your answer. Villas-Boas has further developed his instinct.

Modern day coaching, it seems, is about mind-games after all. Just not as we first thought.

[Zizouz]

http://spielverlagerung.de/2013/03/08/english-bayern-munichs-pressing-201213/

[YFSD]

http://www.guardian.co.uk/football/2013/mar/08/paul-clement-englishman-psg

 

Started from the bottom now we're here

[Zizouz]

 

[Agony]

http://vimeo.com/61867264

 

Busquets>>>

 

[Michel Kane]

The evolution of Cristiano Ronaldo

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Cristiano Ronaldo has under José Mourinho developed into a rare hybrid of a winger and a forward whose game relies on explosive movement rather than pure technical ability. 

That is a far cry from Manchester United where the Portuguese was renowned as one of Europe’s finest dribblers; a tricky winger often criticised for taking too many touches.

José Mourinho, succeeding Manuel Pellegrini – who deployed Ronaldo as a forward upon his arrival at the Bernabéu – has adapted that individualism to his own emphasis on collectivity, making him less flashy but, typically, more effective.

In fact, as this analysis shows, Ronaldo has gone from being a dribbler to something close to a pure finisher, relying more on explosive off-the-ball movement than technique and flair. He may retain his old qualities, but the essence of his game has changed significantly.

 

A winger or a striker?

It’s hard to define Ronaldo’s role in Real Madrid. “We try to find a position that is most comfortable for Cristiano,” Mourinho said in 2011. “And there is always the debate. Is he a forward? I do not think that he is. I think [his game] is one-on-one against a rival.

“Is he a winger? No, because he is also a goalscorer and when you are a winger, how many goals do you score in a season; half a dozen? I think that he is the mixture of two things. He has everything.”

 

 

 

 

 

While Mourinho is right in labelling Ronaldo a hybrid, his analysis differs somewhat from reality. Ronaldo may be a winger positionally (defensively speaking, anyway), but his attacking game leans towards that of a forward. Although Ronaldo is exceptional one-on-one, few of his goals are scored that way. Rather, they are hammered home via ruthless first-time finishes.

Analysing Ronaldo’s 46 goals in La Liga last season (2011/2012), as many as 20 of his 32 goals from open play came via first-time finishes – that is, with no touches prior to the finish (this discounts the 14 goals from set-pieces – 12 penalties and two free-kicks).

 

 

 

 

 

 

This suggests Ronaldo’s technique beyond the finish was irrelevant in 63 per cent of his goals. Rather, his chief weapon was his ability to react quickly, lose his marker and time his runs.

 

Movement

The collective patterns leading to Ronaldo’s goals were also interesting; half of the 32 came from two specific moves. The first was obvious to regular Real Madrid observers; six goals came from Ronaldo accelerating behind the full-back, often in a transition, before cutting inside to finish. Another move was more surprising however; ten goals were scored directly off crosses from the right side.

This reflects one of the patterns Mourinho practices in training sessions. The graph below was created by US-based coach Gary Curneen who observed two of Real Madrid’s pre-season training sessions in Los Angeles this year. It shows a pattern where Di María can find Ronaldo inside the right full-back, as Gonzalo Higuaín or Karim Benzema drags the centre-backs out of position.

 

 

 

 

Analysing Ronaldo’s goals however, alternative combinations stemming from the same move proved more fruitful. The first is Di María hitting a deep cross curling in between the central defenders to find Ronaldo. The second variation is to play in Higuaín or Benzema down the right flank, whose low cross can find Ronaldo at the back post or between the centre-backs. The attacking midfielder – Mesut Özil or Kaká – can also take this run.

 

As such, and as is typical Mourinhology, Ronaldo’s goal ratio owes more to qualities that can be applied to a collective setting. The former individualistic traits; technique, flair and trickery, are now more concealed, substituted with the qualities of a forward. Part of his effectivity is his positioning; every run he makes arrives on the defenders’ blind side. Combined with his extreme focus and explosiveness, Ronaldo is virtually uncatchable.

 

With such a complete package and the blend between two positions, it is difficult to categorise Ronaldo. He is not an inside winger; they either play killer passes, dribble from wide positions or play one-twos; out of Ronaldo’s 32 goals from open play, one came from one-twos, zero from solo-runs. His assist count is underwhelming. And he certainly isn’t a classic winger.

 

 

One can draw parallels to Hulk and his forward/wing role at Porto, or Lukas Podolski’s ability to attack the far post with direct runs. Yet Ronaldo’s overall game is unmatchable – particularly with the added dimension of his aerial play, which makes him as threatening inside the box as outside it.

 

And so, for the endless comparisons with Lionel Messi, the statistics show that Ronaldo’s magic is produced in a vastly different manner. The Argentine is playing his way into history with the ball at his feet. Ronaldo is doing so without it.

[i5_PRODUCER]

Been waiting for one on CR , good lookin out

 

His touches b4 goal ratio wtfff

[O Fenomeno]

I don't know what the uproar was about when I said Cristiano has turned into an athlete who is a great poacher

[The Infamous]

http://performance.fourfourtwo.com/technique/michael-carrick-protecting-the-back-four

 

carrick article on 442 

[i5_PRODUCER]

Da Mastermind